futures, peacebuilding, participation, conflict, decolonial
Futures-thinking encompasses a range of methods, tools and practices designed to explicitly engage with possible and desired futures. The word “futures” is used in the plural to acknowledge the diversity of potential future situations that have yet to materialise. Both external experts and conflict-affected communities use futures-thinking for analytical purposes and to drive societal transformation in conflict contexts. While business and military planning have professionalised the systematic development of futures-thinking methodology, anticipating and preparing for the future is inherent to all human societies. Therefore, systematic and power-critical futures-thinking can lend itself to participatory, reflexive and constructive practices that are beneficial to conflict transformation.

“May the peace be like a feather… Beautiful, soft and resistant.”
The artwork was provided by (Un)Stiching gazes. The group is an interdisciplinary collective of reflection, research and praxis, which tells and collects stories of peace and encounters in Colombia, especially after the signing of the 2016 Peace Agreement. They do so through textile narrative, that is to say through threads, needles and fabrics.
Gelila Enbaye is a Research Associate at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin, where she works on peace and security policy. She contributes to the Stabilization Lab project where she co-developed a simulation game designed to analyze political economy dynamics in conflict settings. Currently, Gelila is working on African perspectives on stabilization policy and conflict management as part of this project.
As a 2024 Think Tank School fellow, Gelila is exploring the potential of futures-thinking in peace mediation through her personal policy project.
ABSTRACT
Futures-thinking is used to gain new perspectives on futures, identify future opportunities, and devise solutions to shape present-day actions. It includes diverse creative approaches that engage with ideas about the future, whether for analytical purposes or as a tool for political intervention. On one side, private and public organisations analyse possible futures to improve strategic planning. On the other, futures-thinking allows political actors and communities to imagine transformational change and desired futures. Increasingly, it is being researched for its value in peacebuilding for conflict prevention and resolution.
In peace and conflict contexts, methods such as scenario analysis, horizon scanning and visioning emphasise collaboration between participants. In contrast, quantitative forecasting relies on data analysis and computer algorithms to analyse possible future trends like conflict onset. Policymaking has seen a proliferation of quantitative early-warning systems and forecasting, reflecting the increased quantification of evidence-based policymaking. While quantitative methods are often used for external conflict analysis, qualitative approaches can also be used for direct interventions with conflict parties and conflict-affected communities.
This entry examines divergent perspectives on decolonisation in the futures-thinking literature. Some authors advocate for the inclusion of both qualitative and quantitative methods, while others critically examine the assumptions underlying these approaches. Critiques of futures-thinking focus on power dynamics and hierarchies, mirroring decolonial perspectives in peace and conflict studies. One key critique is the assumed linearity of futures-thinking models, such as the “futures cone”, which may contrast with non-Western knowledge systems that view time as non-linear or cyclical. Additionally, the notion of neutral methods, rooted in a positivist understanding, is challenged on the grounds that it masks normative assumptions. As a result, the widespread (possibly uncritical) adoption of futures-thinking in policymaking risks reinforcing Western perspectives in peacebuilding.
The entry highlights a number of alternative approaches in futures-thinking that offer pathways for the inclusion of indigenous and local knowledges and practices to foster sustainable peace. First, critical futures approaches such as Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) aim to expose hidden assumptions and challenge entrenched thinking, which is crucial in conflict settings. By engaging with dominant perspectives, underlying systems and worldviews, CLA helps participants to develop critical insights and imagine post-conflict futures that move beyond the conflictual status quo. Second, the Transformative Scenario Process methodology was pioneered during South Africa’s transition from apartheid, and allowed key conflict actors to jointly reflect on and work towards desired futures. Third, narrative foresight, which is closely related to CLA, focuses on the deeper layers of myths and metaphors that shape contentious issues. This approach can harness traditional knowledge instruments, such as oral storytelling, to explore potential futures. By treating reality and futures as continuously negotiated, narrative foresight allows conflict-affected communities to engage meaningfully with their circumstances and envision constructive futures.
The entry thereby demonstrates how futures-thinking offers valuable tools for analysis and intervention in peacebuilding. It also reflects on critical approaches that emphasise the need to address underlying biases and incorporate a broader range of non-Western and local knowledges.
INTRODUCTION
Futures-thinking encompasses a range of methods, tools, and practices designed to explicitly engage with possible and desired futures. The term “futures” is used in the plural to acknowledge the diversity of potential future situations that have yet to materialise (Bisht, 2020Bisht, P. (2020). Decolonizing futures: Finding voice, and making room for non-Western ways of knowing, being and doing. In The Knowledge Base of Futures Studies, edited by R. Slaughter & A. Hines, 216–230. Association of Professional Futurists and Foresight International., p. 218). Other related terms include (strategic) foresight, futures studies, and forecasting. Engagement with futures enables us to deal with uncertainty and anticipate upcoming challenges. In the field of peace and conflict, futures-thinking methodologies are used for analysis and strategic adaptation by actors outside of the conflict, as well as for peacebuilding interventions with affected communities and actors (Bøjer, 2018Bøjer, M. (2018). Transformative Scenarios Process: How stories of the future help to transform conflict in the present. Berghof Foundation., p. 3).
Mainstream approaches in futures-thinking include Scenario Planning, Backcasting, Horizon scanning, Stress-testing, Gaming, Modelling, and Simulation (Popper, 2008Popper, R. (2008). How are foresight methods selected? Foresight, 10(6), 62-89., pp. 88–89). Process designers select approaches according to their ability to overcome institutional and individual biases and to encourage imaginative thinking. Additionally, futures methodologies can be categorised by the objectives of the process, such as predictive/empirical, interpretive, or critical analysis (Inayatullah, 2013aInayatullah, S. (2013a). Futures Studies. Theories and Methods. There’s a Future. Visions for a Better World, 36–66.).
“Mainstream […] strategic adaptation narrows the attention of researchers and practitioners to managing future risks and immediate problem-solving solutions, with limited potential for the holistic transformation required for political and social change.”
Scenario approaches are widespread across various disciplines and sectors as they help process participants to engage with multiple futures and prepare for possible eventualities (Amer et al. 2013Amer, M., Daim, T. U., & Jetter, A. (2013). A review of scenario planning. Futures, 46, 23–40. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2012.10.003, p. 23). Backcasting can draw on scenarios of the future to understand “how desirable futures can be attained” rather than understanding “what futures are likely to happen” (Robinson, 1990Robinson, J. B. (1990). Futures under glass: A recipe for people who hate to predict. Futures, 22(8), 820–842., p. 823). Stress-testing constitutes an approach that aims to “future-proof” new proposals (McCartney et al., 2022aMcCartney, C., Holt, S., Clogg, R., & Parlevliet, M. (2022a). Looking forward: Connecting futures thinking, mediation and reconciliation. Conciliation Resources. , p. 14), which can take various forms such as a gaming set-up to test new policies (Enbaye et al., 2024Enbaye, G., Hensing, J., & Rotmann, P. (2024). Gaming the Political Economy of Conflict: A Practical Guide. Global Public Policy Institute. https://gppi.net/2024/04/22/gaming-the-political-economy-of-conflict). Alternatively, modelling and simulation may rely on quantitative analysis of trends and forecasts (Bankes, 1992Bankes, S. C. (1992). Exploratory Modeling and the Use of Simulation for Policy Analysis. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/N3093.html).
Mainstream futures-thinking approaches are often employed to develop strategies for individual actors within an existing system, e.g. a specific business or a particular political environment. While these approaches acknowledge these systems’ complexity (School of International Futures, 2019School of International Futures. (2019). The SOIF Primer on Strategic Foresight., p. 2), especially in conflict contexts, strategic adaptation narrows the attention of researchers and practitioners to managing future risks and immediate problem-solving solutions, with limited potential for the holistic transformation required for political and social change (Kahane, 2012Kahane, A. (2012). Transformative scenario planning: Working together to change the future. Berrett-Koehler Publishers.). Futures-thinking is also used for conflict transformation and peacebuilding where its potential for power-critical practice is acknowledged.
FUTURES-THINKING IN PEACE AND CONFLICT
Private and public organisations analyse possible and plausible futures to improve strategic planning, for example by analysing violent conflicts for better conflict management. Alternatively, futures-thinking allows political actors and communities to imagine transformational change and desired futures in response to conflict situations. By explicitly engaging with possible futures, both practitioners and analysts seek to deal with uncertainties and manage complex challenges (Sardar, 2010Sardar, Z. (2010). The Namesake: Futures; futures studies; futurology; futuristic; foresight—What’s in a name? Futures, 42(3), 177–184. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2009.11.001, p. 183). Collaborative approaches to futures-thinking are recognised to leverage a more diverse pool of ideas, and to minimise the risk of conformity and collective bias in groups (Weigand et al., 2014Weigand, K., Flanagan, T., Dye, K., & Jones, P. (2014). Collaborative foresight: Complementing long-horizon strategic planning. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 85, 134–152. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2013.08.016, p. 15). They lend themselves to explorative exercises in futures-thinking to create interesting narratives of different futures (Kuosa, 2011Kuosa, T. (2011). Evolution of futures studies. Futures, 43(3), 327–336. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2010.04.001, p. 328).
While there are various categorisations of approaches in futures-thinking, Sohail Inayatullah (2013aInayatullah, S. (2013a). Futures Studies. Theories and Methods. There’s a Future. Visions for a Better World, 36–66., pp. 42–43) distinguishes between 1) predictive/empirical, 2) interpretive and 3) critical approaches.
1.
Predictive or empirical approaches, such as forecasting, assume that the relationship between present and future is deterministic (Inayatullah, 2013aInayatullah, S. (2013a). Futures Studies. Theories and Methods. There’s a Future. Visions for a Better World, 36–66., p. 42; Milojevic, 2002Milojevic, I. (2002). Futures of education: Feminist and post-western critiques and visions. Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia. , p. 37). The objective of forecasts is to reduce uncertainty as much as possible (Bressan et al., 2024Bressan, S., Korb, L. M., & Rotmann, P. (2024). The methodology for threat assessment to be conducted in WP3, 4 and 5. REUNIR., p. 5). Therefore, “forecasts are predictions about tomorrow given information we have about what has happened in the past and up until today” (Nygård et al., 2020Nygård, H. M., Rustad, S. A., Stollenwerk, E., Forø Tollefsen, A., Vestby, J., Berg Larsen, V., & Landsverk, P. (2020). D2.2 Working paper on quantitative risk assessment tool. EU-LISTCO. https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/769886/results, p. 8).
Strategic foresight seeks to use insights from futures exercises and identify strategic action that can be taken in the present. While both predictive and interpretive approaches have their value, we can see that many mainstream futures approaches related to conflict tend to rely on extrapolation from data on past events. Consequently, Jae (2024Jae, K. (2024, May 15). Decolonizing Futures Practice: Opening Up Authentic Alternative Futures * Journal of Futures Studies.) and Bisht (2020Bisht, P. (2020). Decolonizing futures: Finding voice, and making room for non-Western ways of knowing, being and doing. In The Knowledge Base of Futures Studies, edited by R. Slaughter & A. Hines, 216–230. Association of Professional Futurists and Foresight International., p. 219) emphasize that much of Western futures-thinking is guided by deductive reasoning. Inayatullah (2002Inayatullah, S. (2002). Reductionism or layered complexity? The futures of futures studies. Futures, 34(3–4), 295–302., p. 298) notes that “governments [and] business organizations tend to desire one future, a clear answer”. Therefore, policy practitioners increasingly use predictive insights on conflict onset to adapt their policies and interventions in conflict contexts.
Clearly, technological advances have enabled improved quantitative forecasting that seeks to cut through complexity in conflict analysis. Bressan et al. (2019Bressan, S., Nygård, H. M., & Seefeldt, D. (2019). Forecasting and Foresight.) distinguish “three generations” of conflict forecasting, where the 1960s generation focused on data collection on the conflict event level, while the second generation linked game theory to advanced computational models in the 1980s. The third generation of forecasting benefitted from heightened policy interest and institutionalisation of conflict prediction within the scientific community as a form of evaluation (Bressan et al., 2019Bressan, S., Nygård, H. M., & Seefeldt, D. (2019). Forecasting and Foresight., p. 9). Some current efforts in conflict and violence prediction are more granular in data collection, and focus more on theoretical mechanisms that may explain different conflict phases and trajectories of escalation (Bressan et al., 2019Bressan, S., Nygård, H. M., & Seefeldt, D. (2019). Forecasting and Foresight., p. 11).
2.
According to Inayatullah (2013aInayatullah, S. (2013a). Futures Studies. Theories and Methods. There’s a Future. Visions for a Better World, 36–66., p. 43), the interpretive outlook considers truth to be relative since it is shaped by language and cultures. This outlook is inherently pluralist, and assumes that “there is no single, knowable, predictable, or static future since events and actions keep making the future” (Bressan & Korb, 2024Bressan, S., & Korb, L. M. (2024). Making Foresight Count: Success Factors for Futures Analysis in Foreign and Security Policy. Global Public Policy Institute., p. 5). It therefore seeks to create “competing images of the future”, as in scenario processes via the creation of various scenarios (Bressan & Korb, 2024Bressan, S., & Korb, L. M. (2024). Making Foresight Count: Success Factors for Futures Analysis in Foreign and Security Policy. Global Public Policy Institute., p. 5; Inayatullah, 2013aInayatullah, S. (2013a). Futures Studies. Theories and Methods. There’s a Future. Visions for a Better World, 36–66., p. 43). Scenario processes are used by external analysts to better understand conflicts and prepare institutions for policy responses. Interpretive tools such as scenarios can also support conflict parties and affected communities in mediation and dialogue processes to acknowledge their conflicting and common viewpoints, while enabling them to collectively envision possible and desired futures (McCartney et al., 2022aMcCartney, C., Holt, S., Clogg, R., & Parlevliet, M. (2022a). Looking forward: Connecting futures thinking, mediation and reconciliation. Conciliation Resources., p. 16).
For example, the Schlaining Process for the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict included facilitated workshops between 2000 and 2007, where futures-thinking played a major role despite this label not being explicitly used (McCartney et al., 2022aMcCartney, C., Holt, S., Clogg, R., & Parlevliet, M. (2022a). Looking forward: Connecting futures thinking, mediation and reconciliation. Conciliation Resources., p. 20). One exercise engaged participants in a speculative discussion, exploring the conditions under which Georgia could accept Abkhazia’s secession or Abkhazia could accept staying with Georgia. The exercise allowed for an open and imaginative dialogue, and was not focused on anticipating developments in the immediate future; rather, it explored long-term future options for the conflict parties (McCartney et al., 2022bMcCartney, C., Holt, S., Clogg, R., & Parlevliet, M. (2022b). Looking forward: Connecting futures thinking, mediation and reconciliation—Examples Supplement. Conciliation Resources., p. 3).
3.
The power-critical approach to futures-thinking seeks to undo and interrogate assumptions about the future (Goode & Godhe,2017Goode, L., & Godhe, M. (2017). Beyond Capitalist Realism – Why We Need Critical Future Studies. Culture Unbound, 9.; Inayatullah, 2013aInayatullah, S. (2013a). Futures Studies. Theories and Methods. There’s a Future. Visions for a Better World, 36–66., p. 44). These interrogations question assumed hierarchies of concepts. Such assumptions can be made explicit, e.g. by developing multiple scenarios in a futures-driven peace mediation process and comparing them (McCartney et al., 2022aMcCartney, C., Holt, S., Clogg, R., & Parlevliet, M. (2022a). Looking forward: Connecting futures thinking, mediation and reconciliation. Conciliation Resources., p. 14). According to Inayatullah (2013aInayatullah, S. (2013a). Futures Studies. Theories and Methods. There’s a Future. Visions for a Better World, 36–66., p. 44), a critical approach problematises existing images of the future and deconstructs them, with deconstruction understood as an interrogation of power hierarchies where social conditions are not treated as a given. Therefore, critical approaches in futures-thinking contribute to transformation and emancipation.
Methods such as Causal Layered Analysis allow participants in peace mediation processes to critically examine images of the future and engage a broader audience beyond the immediate participants (McCartney et al., 2022aMcCartney, C., Holt, S., Clogg, R., & Parlevliet, M. (2022a). Looking forward: Connecting futures thinking, mediation and reconciliation. Conciliation Resources., p. 14). Alternatively, the Wind Tunnelling process enables participants to stress test policies, interventions or strategies against a diverse range of future scenarios (Roche, 2019Roche, J. M. (2019). The Future Is Ours: Strategic Foresight toolkit – making better decisions. Save the Children UK., p. 102). Wind Tunnelling is already common in mainstream futures-thinking, e.g. in the private sector where the robustness of measures can be evaluated against markers such as effectiveness in terms of achieving the desired impact (Cordova-Pozo & Rouwette, 2023Cordova-Pozo, K., & Rouwette, E. A. J. A. (2023). Types of scenario planning and their effectiveness: A review of reviews. Futures, 149, 103153.). As a critical approach, Wind Tunnelling could be harnessed to evaluate strategies against markers like power imbalances.
4.
Participatory action-learning, developed later by Inayatullah as a fourth approach, is a democratic and reflexive process where images of the future are constructed by a diverse group of stakeholders rather than just by powerbrokers (Inayatullah, 2013aInayatullah, S. (2013a). Futures Studies. Theories and Methods. There’s a Future. Visions for a Better World, 36–66., pp. 38, 40). The process is based on iterative questioning of the alternative images that are created (Inayatullah, 2006Inayatullah, S. (2006). Anticipatory action learning: Theory and practice. Futures, 38(6), 656–666. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2005.10.003, p. 657), and therefore it is closely related to the critical approach to futures-thinking.
Futures-thinking as a new phenomenon in policy?
As Kuosa notes (2011Kuosa, T. (2011). Evolution of futures studies. Futures, 43(3), 327–336. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2010.04.001, p. 331), the emergence of positivist futures-thinking and pluralist foresight in policy coincides with a heightened interest in managing risks related to political and economic uncertainty. Quantification of indicators to analyse social phenomena increased after World War II, and this tendency continues to permeate peace and conflict studies today. Numerous global datasets tracking incidents of organised violence allow researchers to better understand developments in conflict contexts, and Merry (2011Merry, S. E. (2011). Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and Global Governance. Current Anthropology, 52(S3), p. S83–S95. https://doi.org/10.1086/657241, p. S90) notes that increasing demands for evidence-based funding have led to a “corporate form of thinking and governance” in governments. Quantitative approaches such as forecasting are also used in futures-thinking to extrapolate trends for conflict onset (Gleditsch & Ward, 2013Gleditsch, K. S., & Ward, M. D. (2013). Forecasting is difficult, especially about the future: Using contentious issues to forecast interstate disputes. Journal of Peace Research, 50(1), 17–31.), or to design early-warning mechanisms for international organisations and governments (Rød et al., 2024Rød, E. G., Gåsste, T., & Hegre, H. (2024). A review and comparison of conflict early warning systems. International Journal of Forecasting, 40(1), 96–112. ).
However, the quest for positivist “fact-finding” and the use of digital technologies for early warning also pose challenges, since “war is the realm of uncertainty” (Clausewitz, 2007Clausewitz, C. von. (2007). On war (abridged by B. Heuser). Oxford University Press., p. 46; Hirblinger et al., 2023Hirblinger, A. T., Wählisch, M., Keator, K., McNaboe, C., Duursma, A., Karlsrud, J., Sticher, V., Verjee, A., Kyselova, T., & Kwaja, C. M. (2023). Making peace with un-certainty: Reflections on the role of digital technology in peace processes beyond the data hype. International Studies Perspectives, ekad004., pp. 187–189). Policymaking increasingly relies on positivist methods in data collection and analysis, e.g. through early-warning mechanisms for the protection of civilians during UN peace operations (Hirblinger et al., 2023Hirblinger, A. T., Wählisch, M., Keator, K., McNaboe, C., Duursma, A., Karlsrud, J., Sticher, V., Verjee, A., Kyselova, T., & Kwaja, C. M. (2023). Making peace with un-certainty: Reflections on the role of digital technology in peace processes beyond the data hype. International Studies Perspectives, ekad004., p. 202), However, it must be noted that positivist research, like all other research, remains ultimately partial and cannot eliminate the uncertainty of knowing.
“Policymaking increasingly relies on positivist methods in data collection and analysis […]. However, it must be noted that positivist research, like all other research, remains ultimately partial and cannot eliminate the uncertainty of knowing.”
The rise of strategic foresight in policymaking demonstrates how uncertainty may be tackled by anticipating future developments and conceptualising strategic action today. It differs thereby from predictive approaches such as quantitative forecasting and early-warning systems. Strategic foresight practice first gained popularity in business and military organisations post-World War II (Hines, 2020Hines, A. (2020). When Did It Start? Origin of the Foresight Field. World Futures Review, 12(1), 4–11. https://doi.org/10.1177/1946756719889053), aiming to increase organisations’ preparedness for future events by anticipating developments that could impact their future work. Thus, it has a “dual purpose task”, both seeking to capture aspects that are likely causing future change and conceptualising appropriate organizational responses (Iden et al., 2017Iden, J., Methlie, L. B., & Christensen, G. E. (2017). The nature of strategic foresight research: A systematic literature review. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 116, 87–97.). While strategic foresight’s emergence coincided with the “golden time of planning, quantitative methods, positivism, global trade and financing” in the 1940s, other tools for strategic and pluralist future planning were developed much earlier (Kuosa, 2011Kuosa, T. (2011). Evolution of futures studies. Futures, 43(3), 327–336. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2010.04.001, p. 331). For example, Chinese nobles used strategic games for military planning as early as 4,000 years ago, in order to prepare for future developments and test out strategies in a “safe-to-fail environment” (Perla, 2022Perla, P. (2022). Wargaming and the cycle of research and learning. Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies, 5(1)., p. 208; Sabin, 2021Sabin, P. A. (2021). What strategic wargaming can teach us. German Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies., p. 6).
Over the past ten years strategic foresight has become more institutionalised in government work, including in Canada, the United Kingdom and the EU, according to a study by the German Fraunhofer Institut (Fraunhofer ISI, 2022Fraunhofer ISI. (2022). Studie zur Institutionalisierung von Strategischer Vorausschau als Prozess und Methode in der deutschen Bundesregierung –. Fraunhofer-Institut für System- und Innovationsforschung ISI., p. 3). Strategic foresight equips policymakers with tools to enhance decision-making by actively involving them in exploring future scenarios. It is widely employed by foreign and defence ministries, as well as military organizations, to better prepare policymakers and strengthen preventive actions. Most government institutions use both strategic foresight and forecasting methodologies in their work. In Germany, both the defence and foreign ministries have set up foresight and forecasting units focused on futures analysis within their areas of responsibility. For instance, the German Federal Foreign Office established a dedicated unit that utilises the PREVIEW data tool for early conflict warning (Mangelsdorf, 2020Mangelsdorf, H.-C. (2020). KI in der Krisenfrüherkennung. https://www.digitaler-staat.online/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Mangelsdorf_ki2020.pdf), while the Metis Institut für Strategie und Vorausschau (2024Metis. (2024). Metis—Institut für Strategie & Vorausschau. https://metis.unibw.de/de/) advises the German defence ministry by conducting thematic studies based on strategic foresight methodologies to support its planning and decision-making.
Operationalising decolonisation in futures-thinking
Recent initiatives to “decolonise futures-thinking” could be interpreted as responses to trends in quantitative forecasting or positivist strategic foresight in policymaking (Bisht, 2020Bisht, P. (2020). Decolonizing futures: Finding voice, and making room for non-Western ways of knowing, being and doing. In The Knowledge Base of Futures Studies, edited by R. Slaughter & A. Hines, 216–230. Association of Professional Futurists and Foresight International., 2024Bisht, P. (2024). Decolonizing Futures Initiative. Decolonizing Futures Initiative. https://www.decolonizingfutures.org). Literature and initiatives problematise implicit power hierarchies in many mainstream futures approaches. They demand an interrogation of these approaches and resulting futures, because “the future is not neutral but rather colonized” according to Inayatullah (2013bInayatullah, S. (2013b). Learnings from futures studies: Learnings from dator. Journal of Futures Studies, 18(2), 1–10., p. 2). Therefore, initiatives such as the “Critiquing Futures” approach by SUPERRR Lab offer an initial framework for critical and decolonial engagement with futures in digital policy and beyond (Stumptner & Keleta, 2024Stumptner, Q., & Keleta, F. (2024, March 28). Critiquing Futures. SUPERRR Network. https://superrr.net). Within futures-thinking as well, there is a risk of reproducing power structures if the “coloniality of power” is not rendered explicitly (Quijano, 2000Quijano, A. (2000). Coloniality of Power and Eurocentrism in Latin America. International Sociology, 15(2), 215–232. https://doi.org/10.1177/0268580900015002005).
On the one hand, Jae (2024Jae, K. (2024, May 15). Decolonizing Futures Practice: Opening Up Authentic Alternative Futures * Journal of Futures Studies.) suggests that decolonisation can come from a diversity of methods employed in futures-thinking. Diversity in methods and approaches is relevant to cultivating a plurality of voices; alternatives to mainstream approaches such as scenario planning are also discussed later in this entry. However, futures-thinking can also risk reinforcing existing power structures if participants lack a “safe space” that is free from fear of repercussions, or if the group involved is too homogeneous (Kambunga et al., 2023Kambunga, A. P., Smith, R. C., Winschiers-Theophilus, H., & Otto, T. (2023). Decolonial design practices: Creating safe spaces for plural voices on contested pasts, presents, and futures. Design Studies, 86, 101170.). Therefore, decolonial engagement with futures in peace and conflict must also problematise key elements in mainstream approaches, including power hierarchies/inclusion and conceptions of time.
“Futures-thinking cannot resolve all power dynamics and asymmetries […] It is essential to include a wide range of participants in the process, fostering a participatory environment that embraces diverse perspectives.”
In contentious conflict contexts, futures-thinking can become a transformative tool for inclusion when it empowers and centres the agency of marginalised groups. However, it must also be noted that futures-thinking cannot resolve all power dynamics and asymmetries, even though it provides many opportunities for more inclusive processes. To ensure a transformative approach it is essential to include a wide range of participants in the process, fostering a participatory environment that embraces diverse perspectives (Nikolova, 2014Nikolova, B. (2014). The rise and promise of participatory foresight. European Journal of Futures Research, 2(1), 33. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40309-013-0033-2, p. 2). Ideally, futures-thinking processes in areas like conflict analysis and peacebuilding must seek to actively “counteract psychological, social and institutional biases” (Bressan & Korb, 2024Bressan, S., & Korb, L. M. (2024). Making Foresight Count: Success Factors for Futures Analysis in Foreign and Security Policy. Global Public Policy Institute., p. 5).
Broad participation in all dimensions of peacebuilding, including conflict analysis, implementation and monitoring and evaluation, increase the process’ legitimacy and validity (Pauls, 2023Pauls, E. (2023). Participatory methods in peacebuilding work. Berghof Foundation., p. 8). The knowledge and information that feed into a futures-thinking process are closely tied to issues of power (Foucault, 1991Foucault, M. (1991). Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison (reprint). Penguin Books.). A key pillar of any futures-thinking process is deciding who is included in the process and whose interests it is designed to serve. Sardar (1996Sardar, Z. (1996). Natural born futurist. Futures, 28(6–7), 665–668., p. 667) frames the question as “who benefits” in any given “futures endeavor”. Similarly, SUPERRR Lab’s “Critiquing Futures” catalogue includes questions that aim to allow scenario processes to assess power hierarchies and understand which societal groups might be excluded in a given scenario (Stumptner & Keleta, 2024Stumptner, Q., & Keleta, F. (2024, March 28). Critiquing Futures. SUPERRR Network.). Similarly, the liberal vs. local peacebuilding debate elucidates how liberal assumptions about peace afford limited agency to local actors and regard “external actors as omnipotent” (Sending, 2011Sending, O. J. (2011). The effects of peacebuilding: Sovereignty, patronage and power. In A Liberal Peace?: The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding, edited by S. Campbell, D. Chandler, & M. Sabaratnam, 55–68. Bloomsbury., p. 55). Consequently, marginalised groups and actors may be structurally excluded as agents in the peacebuilding sector (Peace Direct, 2023Peace Direct. (2023). Race, Power, and Peacebuilding: Insights and lessons from a global consultation. Peace Direct.). “Hybrid peace” suggests that local actors may either adapt to or resist liberal notions of peace, thereby creating a hybrid environment between the international and local (Mac Ginty, 2010Mac Ginty, R. (2010). Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace. Security Dialogue, 41(4), 391–412. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010610374312). Consequently, local peace actors continue to operate within the structures of liberal peace, which influences the transformative potential of futures-thinking approaches. When futures-thinking processes are applied in conflict contexts, challenges related to inclusion and power imbalances also are likely to emerge unless steps are taken to ensure pluralist processes (Bressan & Korb, 2024Bressan, S., & Korb, L. M. (2024). Making Foresight Count: Success Factors for Futures Analysis in Foreign and Security Policy. Global Public Policy Institute., p. 5).

Therefore, the framework excludes the past from analysis, and assumes a “singular present” (Carey et al., 2021Carey, H., Arredondo, R., Bansal, M., & Costes, C. (2021). Envisioning new futuring models: Past, plurality, and positionality. With Design: Reinventing Design Modes, IASDR., p. 2). However, Bisht (2020Bisht, P. (2020). Decolonizing futures: Finding voice, and making room for non-Western ways of knowing, being and doing. In The Knowledge Base of Futures Studies, edited by R. Slaughter & A. Hines, 216–230. Association of Professional Futurists and Foresight International., p. 219) emphasises the plurality of conditions in the present that are not visualised in the singular starting point of such a cone. In addition, non-Western perspectives might view the relationship between past-present-future as cyclical, and these views are excluded by this mainstream conceptualisation in futures-thinking (Sardar, 2021Sardar, Z. (2021). On the Nature of Time in Postnormal Times. Journal of Futures Studies, 25(4). https://doi.org/10.6531/JFS.202106_25(4).0002, p. 19).
Linearity is also prevalent in peacebuilding where the “linear cause-effect problem-solving model” has dominated policy and academia in efforts to respond to large-scale violence (Paffenholz, 2021Paffenholz, T. (2021). Perpetual Peacebuilding: A New Paradigm to Move Beyond the Linearity of Liberal Peacebuilding. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 15(3), 367–385., p. 367; De Coning, 2018De Coning, C. (2018). Adaptive peacebuilding. International Affairs, 94(2), 301–317., p. 302). According to De Coning, however, the liberal peace paradigm is “waning”, and its theory of change to sustainable peace is not holding up anymore. As a “deterministic-design” model, liberal peace suggests that the implementation of democracy, a free market economy and human rights will inevitably lead to sustainable peace in conflict-affected contexts (De Coning, 2018De Coning, C. (2018). Adaptive peacebuilding. International Affairs, 94(2), 301–317., p. 302). However, current literature acknowledges that paths to peace are not linear, but require an iterative process of adaptation informed by complexity (De Coning,2019De Coning, C. (2019). Complexity thinking and adaptive peacebuilding. ACCORD, 28. https://nupi.brage.unit.no/nupi-xmlui/handle/11250/2598299).
Forecasting and predictive approaches in futures-thinking also rely on linearity since they assume that the “universe is deterministic” (Inayatullah, 2013aInayatullah, S. (2013a). Futures Studies. Theories and Methods. There’s a Future. Visions for a Better World, 36–66., p. 42). This includes conflict early-warning systems, e.g. the European Union’s External Action Service (EEAS) that seeks to anticipate future risks based on available data on past events (Rød et al., 2024Rød, E. G., Gåsste, T., & Hegre, H. (2024). A review and comparison of conflict early warning systems. International Journal of Forecasting, 40(1), 96–112.). The EEAS champions its early-warning system that “identifies structural risk factors that frequently correlate with the outburst of violence” (EEAS, 2022EEAS. (2022). Fact Sheet: Early Warning System. European External Action Service:ISP.2 – Conflict Prevention and Peace Mediation.). Such conflict early-warning frameworks serve to monitor ongoing developments and flag any potential escalations of violence for analysts. As a tool for strategic foresight, policymakers use conflict early warning to prioritise preventative action over ad hoc crisis management.
Early-warning systems heavily rely on data collection and quantitative analysis, with predetermined thresholds set to flag conflict risks to users (Sweijs & Teer, 2022Sweijs, T., & Teer, J. (2022). Practices, Principles and Promises of Conflict Early Warning Systems. Hague Centre for Strategic Studies., p. 18). Consequently, the risk of false negatives and false positives can limit the value of analytical insights. In addition, the “warning-response gap” is widely discussed in the literature as it counteracts the objective of preventative political action and response to mitigate the escalation of violence (Beaumais, 2023Beaumais, L. (2023). Les systèmes d’alerte précoce ou l’illusion de l’objectivation. Cités, 95(3), 83–96. https://doi.org/10.3917/cite.095.0083; Muggah & Whitlock, 2022Muggah, R., & Whitlock, M. (2022). Reflections on the Evolution of Conflict Early Warning. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 10(1), 2. https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.857, p. 3). Furthermore, Kanno (2014Kanno, T. (2014). Critical Early Warning: Reframing the Study and Practice of Conflict Early Warning, PhD Thesis, King’s College London (University of London)., p. 4) questions the implicit “epistemological foundations” of conflict early-warning systems. Drawing on Zanotti’s (2005Zanotti, L. (2005). Governmentalizing the Post-Cold War International Regime: The UN Debate on Democratization and Good Governance. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 30(4), 461–487.) Foucauldian view of “global governmentality”, Kanno argues that conflict early warning seeks “to make […] illiberal and irresponsible states more legible and transparent to the international community” (Kanno, 2014Kanno, T. (2014). Critical Early Warning: Reframing the Study and Practice of Conflict Early Warning, PhD Thesis, King’s College London (University of London)., p. 5). Since international security actors, such as governments and international organisations, cannot fully control violent environments, they prioritise strategies aimed at risk reduction and prediction (Kanno, 2014Kanno, T. (2014). Critical Early Warning: Reframing the Study and Practice of Conflict Early Warning, PhD Thesis, King’s College London (University of London)., p. 98).
Critical approaches in futures-thinking
Critical futures approaches, including Causal Layered Analysis (CLA), seek to reveal hidden assumptions and confront entrenched thinking patterns, which is essential in settings affected by conflict (Inayatullah, 2004Inayatullah, S. (2004). The causal layered analysis (CLA) reader. Theory and Case Studies of an Integrative and Transformative Methodology, 1, 1–52.). By explicitly deconstructing the “litany, systemic causes, worldviews and myths” of a particular problem addressed through the futures process, process participants engage with implicit biases on various cognitive levels. CLA allows for these assumptions to be problematised instead of letting them limit the imagination of process participants (Inayatullah, 2004Inayatullah, S. (2004). The causal layered analysis (CLA) reader. Theory and Case Studies of an Integrative and Transformative Methodology, 1, 1–52., p. 17).

Currently, there is limited literature suggesting that this methodology has been used in conflict contexts with affected individuals or communities, despite its potential for transformative change (Lipsett, 2020Lipsett, I. (2020, June 30). Using Causal Layered Analysis for Transformational Change. Institute for the Future. https://www.iftf.org/insights/using-causal-layered-analysis-for-transformational-change/). Similar to the Transformative Scenario Process (TSP), engagement with implicit assumptions within the CLA framework can open up transformative spaces by unpacking “wicked community problems” through a critical lens (Bishop & Dzidic, 2014Bishop, B. J., & Dzidic, P. L. (2014). Dealing with Wicked Problems: Conducting a Causal Layered Analysis of Complex Social Psychological Issues. American Journal of Community Psychology, 53(1–2), 13–24., p. 13).
Alternative approaches in futures-thinking can offer pathways for the inclusion of local knowledges and practices to foster sustainable peace. For example, South Africa’s “Mont Fleur” initiative pioneered the Transformative Scenario Process methodology during the country’s transition after apartheid (McCartney et al., 2022aMcCartney, C., Holt, S., Clogg, R., & Parlevliet, M. (2022a). Looking forward: Connecting futures thinking, mediation and reconciliation. Conciliation Resources., p. 15). Drawing on experiences from the private sector, the methodology allowed key conflict actors to jointly explore scenarios of “what can happen, rather than […] what should or will happen” in the future (McCartney et al., 2022aMcCartney, C., Holt, S., Clogg, R., & Parlevliet, M. (2022a). Looking forward: Connecting futures thinking, mediation and reconciliation. Conciliation Resources., p. 15). In scenario planning for conflict analysis, scenarios are used for adaptive objectives, i.e. to allow an organisation to adapt its strategies and responses in the face of a conflict (Bøjer, 2018Bøjer, M. (2018). Transformative Scenarios Process: How stories of the future help to transform conflict in the present. Berghof Foundation., p. 3). In contrast, TSP allows conflict parties and communities affected by conflict to build trust and overcome fixed viewpoints. Therefore, TSP targets the relationships and intentions of participants that will be transformed by engaging in the process (Bøjer, 2018Bøjer, M. (2018). Transformative Scenarios Process: How stories of the future help to transform conflict in the present. Berghof Foundation., p. 4).
“It is important to acknowledge that all communities engage with futures, and can therefore implement forms of futures-thinking in their conflict resolution and transformation.”
Narrative foresight, a methodology closely related to CLA, focuses on deeper layers of myths and metaphors that shape contentious issues (Milojević & Inayatullah, 2015Milojević, I., & Inayatullah, S. (2015). Narrative foresight. Futures, 73, 151–162.). Narrative work is a crucial pillar for peacebuilding and conflict resolution because narratives can be multifaceted; complex narratives may support social engagement in the face of grievances. In contrast, simplistic narratives can also drive polarisation and the escalation of violence in societies (Fairey, 2024Fairey, T. (2024). Peace is possible: The role of strategic narratives in peacebuilding. Media, War & Conflict, 17(1), 3–22. https://doi.org/10.1177/17506352231160360, p. 8; Institute for Integrated Transitions, 2021Institute for Integrated Transitions. (2021). The Role of Narrative in Managing Conflict and Supporting Peace (IFIT Discussion Paper)., p. 3). Therefore, peacebuilding seeks to “reconstitute, or re-story the narrative” in order to cultivate peace (Lederach, 2005Lederach, J. P. (2005). The moral imagination: The art and soul of building peace. Oxford University Press., p. 146), allowing strategic narrative peacebuilding to integrate multiple narratives rather than forging a single story in conflictual environments (Fairey, 2024Fairey, T. (2024). Peace is possible: The role of strategic narratives in peacebuilding. Media, War & Conflict, 17(1), 3–22. https://doi.org/10.1177/17506352231160360, p. 9). Complex narratives are a fundamental aspect of futures thinking, particularly in narrative foresight which integrates predictive, interpretive and critical approaches.
Additionally, narrative foresight creates desired futures according to the needs and preferences of the involved participants (Milojević & Inayatullah, 2015Milojević, I., & Inayatullah, S. (2015). Narrative foresight. Futures, 73, 151–162., p. 5). Its focus on transformation allows participants to dive deeper into the myth/metaphor layer of CLA in a joint learning process (2015Milojević, I., & Inayatullah, S. (2015). Narrative foresight. Futures, 73, 151–162., p. 14). Batchelor (2007Batchelor, D. (2007). Narrative and Traditional Peacebuilding Systems: Implications for Transitional Justice in Africa and Justice Systems in Britain. British Journal of Community Justice (BJCJ), 5(1)., p. 6) highlights how the Western transitional justice industry is currently seeing a “return to narrative”, while indigenous and traditional peacebuilding mechanisms have always relied on storytelling to cultivate peace. Consequently, narrative foresight can be used as a practice that harnesses alternative knowledge instruments such as oral storytelling to explore and unlock alternative futures. Milojević highlights a 2009 peace education project for young people in Serbia where future-oriented storytelling was used to counter narratives of domination and promote alternative inclusive futures (Milojević & Izgarjan, 2014Milojević, I., & Izgarjan, A. (2014). Creating alternative futures through storytelling: A case study from Serbia. Futures, 57, 51–61.). By treating reality and futures as continuously negotiated between stakeholders (Milojević & Inayatullah, 2015Milojević, I., & Inayatullah, S. (2015). Narrative foresight. Futures, 73, 151–162., p. 5), narrative foresight allows conflict-affected communities to engage meaningfully with the roots of their grievances and envision constructive futures.
Conclusion
This entry highlights the potential of futures-thinking for conflict transformation and peacebuilding. While recognising the growing prominence of futures-thinking in the private sector and public policy, this entry leverages its utility to promote peace and engage with conflict actors. A distinction is made between adaptive and transformative futures-thinking approaches, with these alternative transformative approaches, such as narrative foresight and CLA, offering tools to challenge power hierarchies. Both are recognised in academic literature as critical methodologies and have been applied in areas such as peace education.
It is important to acknowledge that all communities engage with futures, and can therefore implement forms of futures-thinking in their conflict resolution and transformation. Further research is needed to explore how futures-thinking has supported various processes of conflict transformation beyond the examples presented in this entry.
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How to cite this entry:
Enbaye, G. 2025: “Futures-Thinking.” Virtual Encyclopaedia – Rewriting Peace and Conflict. 29.01.2024. https://rewritingpeaceandconflict.net/futures-thinking.
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